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NOTES AND COMMENTS
attention to the conflicting lines of authority in North Carolina on
.he subject, and. to the need for definitive legislative action. While
a complete revision of the system of sheriff's bonds probably would
be best, it is submitted that the adoption of the following statute
would clarify the existing confusion and afford the public that de-
gree of security which seems desirable:
No clause for the faithful execution of his office, found in the
official bond of any public officer, shall be construed as limited to
the specific duties therein enumerated, but every such clause shall
render such officer and the sureties on his official bond liable to
any person injured by any wrongful or unauthorized act done by
said officer by virtue or under color of office.
J. A. KLEEMEIER, JR.
Trial-Power of Court to Dismiss an Action or Defense
Upon Opening Statement of Counsel.
Plaintiff, as administrator, brought an action to recover for the
death of his infant son, who was drowned after falling through an
unguarded hole in the defendant's wharf. It was contended that the
wharf, together with sandpiles thereon, brought the case within the
doctrine of attractive nuisance. After the opening statement of the
plaintiff's counsel, a verdict was directed for the defendant on the
ground that it was not stated in such opening that the alleged nui-
sance was visible from the highway. Held, error. It was inferable
from counsel's statement that the wharf and sandpiles could be read-
ily seen from a near-by street.1
The privilege of making an opening statement is afforded counsel
in order that he may outline his proofs to the jury and aid them in
their understanding of the case to be presented.2 It should be no
more than an informal summary of the intended evidence, and can-
not take the place of pleadings in determining the issues to be tried,3
I Best v. District of Columbia, 54 Sup. Ct. 487, 78 L. ed. 635 (1934).
' Paige v. Illinois Steel Co., 233 Ill. 313, 84 N. E. 239 (1908) ; State v.
Sheets, 89 N. C. 583 (1883); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PRocEDu1x (1929), §561. Nor should the counsel be permitted to argue the
merits under the guise of sketching his own case, Posell v. Herscovitz, 237
Mass. 513, 130 N. E. 69 (1921).
2Hunter Milling Co. v. Allen, 65 Kan. 158, 69 Pac. 159 (1902); Douglas
v. Marsh, 141 Mich. 209, 104 N. W. 624 (1905); Moore v. Dawson, 220 Mo.
App. 791, 277 S. W. 58 (1925). The party should not be confined in the intro-
duction of evidence to the statements made in the opening. Winfield v. Feder,
169 I1. App. 480 (1912); Marcy v. Shelburne Falls & C. St. Ry. Co., 210
Mass. 197, 96 N. E. 130 (1911); Petherick v. Order of the Amaranth, 114
Mich. 420, 72 N. W. 262 (1897).
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though admissions therein, when deliberately made, are binding
upon the litigant.4 The doctrine that such opening may be the basis
for judgment is largely an outgrowth of a famous United States
Supreme Court decision, Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms
Co.,5 decided in 1880. There the plaintiff sought to recover commis-
sions for his services in bringing about a sale of firearms to the
Turkish government. The opening of plaintiff's attorney showed
clearly that the plaintiff had procured the sale through his influence
as a diplomatic official of the purchasing government. Thereupon
the case was dismissed as being founded upon a corrupt and un-
conscionable cause of action, which the court refused to entertain.
The principles of this case have been expanded until, at the present
time, the practice of deciding cases upon the basis of the opening
statement has become a relatively common one, and a dismissal may
be had upon much slimmer grounds than those presented in the
Oscanyan case.
The attitude of the courts on a specific case is not easily predict-
able, as each case must, to a great extent, stand upon its own bottom,
and so much depends upon the discretion of the trial court, but the
authorities seem to group themselves into three rather indistinctly
defined groups:
(1) Some of the courts have refused to sanction the practice,
either because it is considered an abortive method of deciding cases,
which deprives the litigant of his day in court,6 or because of stat-
utory inhibitions.
7
(2) A second group are willing to go the whole way, and will
dismiss the case when the opening statement fails to show facts
which, if proved, would make out a cause of action or defense.8
4WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed., 1923), Vol. 5, §2594; cf. Wasmer v. Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co., 166 Mo. App. 215, 148 S. W. 155 (1912).
r103 U. S. 261, 26 L. ed. 539 (1880).
' Pietsh v. Pietsh, 245 Ill. 454, 92 N. E. 325 (1910) ; Fischer v. Fischer, 5
Wis. 472 (1856) ; Fletcher v. London & North Western R. Co., [1892] 1 Q. B.
122, 65 L. T. Rep. 605. The reasons for such holding are more persuasive in
England than in this country, due to the division of labor between advocate and
solicitor. Bailey, The Admission of Barristers and Solicitors in England,
(1928) 14 MAss. L. Q. 60, at 60. It has been intimated by at least one court
which adheres to this rule that, should a similar situation be presented, the
Oscanyan case would be followed. Martin Emerich Outfitting Co. v. Sigel,
Cooper & Co., 108 Ill. App. 364 (1903) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Garren, 261 Ill. App.
513 (1931).
SWheler v. Oregon R. & Navigation Co., 16 Idaho 375, 102 Pac. 347
(1909).
' Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 145 Pac. 516 (1914); Energy Electrical Co. v.
General Electric Co., 262 Mass. 534, 160 N. E. 278 (1928) ; Spicer v. Bonker,
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However, it may be noted, in this connection, that counsel is given
ample opportunity to amend and elaborate upon his opening,9 and
he is to have the advantage of every reasonable inference which may
be drawn from the facts stated. 10 Moreover, the court should point
out to him wherein his statement is defective in order that such de-
fect may, if possible, be remedied. 1
(3) The remaining decisions adopt a middle ground, and will dis-
miss the action after the opening statement only when something is
affirmatively asserted therein which will absolutely preclude the cause
of action or defense.
12
45 Mich. 630, 8 N. W. 518 (1881); Berkman v. Cohn, 111 N. J. L. 229, 168
At. 290 (1933) ; Cornell v. Morrison, 87 Ohio St. 215, 100 N. E. 817 (1912)
("It is, in substance and effect, for the purposes of the motion, an agreed state-
ments of facts.") ; Smith v. Groesbeck, 54 S. D. 350, 223 N. W. 308 (1929)
commented upon (1929) 15 IA. L. REv. 227; cf. Neckel v. Fox, 110 Ohio St.
150, 143 N. E. 389 (1924) ; Coughlin v. State Bank of Portland, 117 Ore. 83,
243 Pac. 78 (1926) (In view of the complexity of the facts it was error to
dismiss the complaint on the opening statement.).
Barto v. Detroit Iron & Steel Co., 155 Mich. 94, 118 N. W. 738 (1908) ;
Donnelly v. Paramount Organization, 109 N. J. L. 57, 160 Atl. 569 (1932) ;
note (1933) 83 A. L. R. 221.
"Kelick v. Cleveland, 24 Ohio App. 82, 156 N. E. 248 (1927); HYArr,
TRIALS (1924), Vol. 2, §1459.
u Haynes v. Maubury, 166 Mich. 498, 131 N. W. 110 (1911).
'Butler v. National Home for Soldiers, 144 U. S. 64, 12 Sup. Ct. 581, 36
L. ed. 346 (1891); United States v. Deitrich, 126 Fed. 676 (C. C. D. Neb.,
1904) (Defendant was indicted for receiving bribes while a member of the
Senate. The opening statement for the prosecution showed that he was not, in
fact, a member of that body at the time of the alleged offense. The court said:
[at 677] "Where by the opening statement for the prosecution in a criminal
trial, and after full opportunity for correction of any" ambiguity, error or
omission in the statement, a fact is clearly and deliberately admitted which
must necessarily prevent a conviction, the court may upon its own motion or
that of counsel, close the case by directing a verdict for the accused. The
court has the same power to act upon such an admission that it would have to
act upon the evidence if produced. It would be a waste of time to listen to
the evidence of other matters when at the outset a fact is clearly and delib-
erately admitted which must defeat the prosecution in the end.") ; Smith v.
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 254 Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 2d. 1918) (promoter
seeking to recover commissions showed that he was not employed, and that the
alleged deal was never consummated) ; Millsaps, Hatchett & Co. v. Nixon. 102
Ark. 435, 144 S. W. 915 (1912) (contract of surety shown to be within the
statute of frauds); Brasher v. Rabenstein, 71 Kan. 455, 80 Pac. 950 (1905) ;
State v. Hall, 55 Mont. 182, 175 Pac. 267 (1918) (action should not be dis-
missed merely because opening failed to state that crime was committed within
the jurisdiction of the court) ; Miner v. Town of Hopkinton, 73 N. H. 232,
60 At]. 433 (1905) (statement contained facts which would take case out of
perview of statute under which it was instituted) ; Hoffman House v. Foote,
172 N. Y. 384, 65 N. E. 169 (1902) ; Denefeld v. Baumann, 40 App. Div. 502,
58 N. Y. Supp. 110 (1899) (The statement contained facts which showed
affirmatively that it was solely the negligence of the tenant which caused the
injury; held, that the action was properly dismissed as to -the landlord.);
Preusse v. Childwold Park Hotel, 134 App. Div. 383, 119 N. Y. Supp. 98
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This practice of deciding cases on the basis of the opening state-
ment is subject to criticism, in that it seems to place greater emphasis
upon an informal, and often perfunctory, speech of counsel than
upon the carefully-drawn answer or complaint. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the benefits to be derived from a careful use of this power
greatly outweigh the possible evils which may result from its abuse.
It is to be employed only in extreme cases, and then only after the
party has been given the benefit of every doubt. Moreover, there is
a further safeguard, which, psychologically at any rate, will prove a
deterrence to any rash action on the part of the trial judge. If the
action is dismissed, it is more than likely to meet with reversal at the
hands of the appellate tribunal; whereas, if the motion is denied, and
the party is able to go forward and prove his case, the defect, if any,
is cured ;1a if he is unable to accomplish this, his opponent is already
victorious without an appeal.
JOEL B. ADAMS,
Trusts-Constructive Trust to Protect Victims of Theft.
B, an officeir of a building and loan association, embezzled some
$8,000,000 from the association over a period of nine years. The
embezzled funds were invested in, and deposited to the account of, a
dummy oil corporation organized and controlled by B. In an action
by the receiver of the building and loan association to declare a con-
structive trust upon all the assets of the oil corporation, held, a trust
would be impressed upon the embezzled funds traced to a bank ac-
count of the oil company, and as far as they could be traced into
other assets of the oil company. 1 Other parties, who were creditors
of the oil company by reason of money advanced, and credit extended
in sales transactions, were protected pro tanto.
There has been much reluctance in the application of the con-
structive trust device for the protection of victims of theft. It has
been variously objected that there are adequate remedies at law,
2
that assumption of equity jurisdiction deprives the defendant of right
(1909) (claim shown to be barred by the statute of limitations) ; Abraham v.
Gelwick, 123 Okla. 248, 253 Pac. 84 (1926) ; Redding v. Puget Sound Iron &
Steel Works, 36 Wash. 642, 79 Pac. 308 (1905).
"1Glass v. American Stores Co., 110 N. J. L. 152, 164 Atl. 305 (1933); cf.
Meaney v. Doyle, 176 Mass. 218, 177 N. E. 6 (1931) ("Although a trial judge
has power to direct a verdict at the close of the opening, he is not, as a matter
of law, obliged to do so . .. whether so to rule rests in his discretion.").
Elmer Co. L't'4. v. Kemp, 67 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
'Robinson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 193 Fed. 399 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912)
(Insurance company director embezzled funds and turned them over to culpable
president. Accounting denied.).
